Building a Unified Security Strategy for 2028 Olympics

Key Takeaways

The 2028 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles represent both a tremendous opportunity and a complex security challenge for California and federal authorities. As the world’s premier sporting event approaches, the need for a cohesive California federal security planning 2028 Olympics strategy has never been more critical. With an estimated 800,000 visitors expected, along with athletes from over 200 nations and unprecedented media attention, the security requirements will dwarf those of any previous event held on American soil.

The success of the Games will be measured not just by athletic achievements but by the invisible security architecture that enables a safe, secure celebration of international competition. This demands a level of federal-state security partnerships that transcends the political divisions that have often characterized American governance in recent years.

This article explores how bipartisan collaboration in security planning can create a unified approach to protecting the 2028 Olympics while ensuring the event remains accessible, welcoming, and true to Olympic ideals. By examining current responsibilities, identifying challenges, and learning from past successes, we can envision a pathway toward effective cooperation that prioritizes public safety while navigating complex political realities.

Current Federal and State Security Roles

Understanding the current division of responsibilities

The security architecture for the 2028 Olympics will operate across multiple jurisdictional layers, each with distinct responsibilities yet requiring seamless integration. At the federal level, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will likely serve as the primary coordinating agency, with the event designated as a National Special Security Event (NSSE). This designation activates specific protocols and places the U.S. Secret Service in a lead role for designing and implementing security plans.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will manage intelligence operations and counter-terrorism efforts, while Customs and Border Protection (CBP) will enhance screening processes at ports of entry. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will implement additional security measures at airports and transportation hubs across Southern California.

At the state level, the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) will coordinate the state’s security resources, including the California Highway Patrol (CHP) and the California National Guard. These agencies will work alongside local authorities, primarily the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, who bring crucial local knowledge and will provide the majority of day-to-day security personnel.

The Olympic Security Command will likely follow a unified command structure similar to previous Games, with representation from all major stakeholders but clear lines of authority established through memoranda of understanding well before the event. This complex web of California federal security planning 2028 Olympics requires early and continuous coordination to function effectively.

Challenges in coordination and communication

Despite well-established frameworks for multi-agency cooperation, several structural and operational challenges complicate effective coordination:

• Information sharing barriers: Federal agencies operate under different classification protocols than state and local partners, creating obstacles to the seamless sharing of intelligence and threat assessments.
• Budgetary tensions: Security costs for the 2028 Olympics are projected to exceed $2 billion, with ongoing negotiations about the division of financial responsibility between federal, state, and local authorities.
• Technological disparities: Varying levels of technological capability and system compatibility between agencies can impede real-time communication during operations.
• Jurisdictional ambiguities: Overlapping authorities create potential for confusion in areas such as maritime security in Los Angeles Harbor or air security around Olympic venues.

These coordination challenges are further complicated by the extended timeline of Olympic operations. Unlike a one-day event, the Games span over two weeks, with many venues operating simultaneously across a wide geographic area. The “Olympic footprint” encompasses not just competition venues but training facilities, athlete accommodations, transportation corridors, and public gathering spaces.

A 2023 audit of inter-agency security exercises identified communication as the most significant vulnerability in federal-state security partnerships. The report noted that “agencies continue to operate in relative isolation during planning phases, coming together too late in the process to develop truly integrated security solutions.” Addressing these foundational issues requires political will from leaders at all levels of government, regardless of party affiliation.

Challenges and Opportunities for Bipartisan Cooperation

Identifying potential obstacles to collaboration

Political divisions present genuine obstacles to the seamless federal-state security partnerships necessary for a successful 2028 Olympics. These challenges manifest in several specific ways:

Resource allocation tensions often become politicized, with federal and state officials sometimes positioning themselves to minimize financial exposure rather than optimizing security outcomes. This can be exacerbated when different parties control different levels of government, each seeking to demonstrate fiscal responsibility to their constituencies.

Policy disagreements on security approaches can impede planning, particularly around controversial areas such as surveillance technology deployment, immigration enforcement near Olympic venues, and the appropriate level of military involvement. These differences reflect legitimate philosophical perspectives but require resolution for effective security implementation.

Public messaging conflicts can undermine confidence in security preparations when officials from different parties present contradictory assessments of readiness or risk. The public face of Olympic security must project competence and cohesion, regardless of behind-the-scenes political differences.

Leadership discontinuity poses another challenge, as the planning timeline for the 2028 Olympics spans multiple election cycles. Changes in administration at federal, state, or local levels could disrupt planning continuity if security preparations become entangled with partisan transitions.

A 2022 survey of emergency management professionals identified political considerations as the third most significant barrier to effective multi-jurisdictional crisis planning, behind only funding limitations and bureaucratic complexity. This suggests that bipartisan collaboration in security planning is not merely a preference but a necessity for operational success.

Opportunities for overcoming political differences

Despite these challenges, the 2028 Olympics present several strategic opportunities for bipartisan collaboration in security planning that transcend typical political divisions:

• Shared visibility and accountability: The global spotlight on Olympic security creates mutual accountability that can motivate cooperation across party lines, as failures would reflect poorly on all involved regardless of political affiliation.
• Public safety as common ground: Security planning centers on public safety—a universally shared value that provides natural common ground even among officials with different policy priorities.
• Technical rather than political framing: Approaching security challenges as technical problems requiring expert solutions rather than political issues needing ideological positions helps depoliticize planning processes.
• Leveraging professional networks: Law enforcement and security professionals often have existing relationships across jurisdictional and political boundaries that can provide foundations for cooperation.

The establishment of a politically balanced advisory committee composed of security experts from both major parties could provide a mechanism for resolving potential partisan conflicts. This approach was successfully implemented during the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics, where security planning spanned the transition between Clinton and Bush administrations.

Additionally, creating clear decision-making frameworks with established technical criteria for security investments can help insulate operational decisions from political considerations. When security measures are evaluated based on effectiveness metrics rather than political preferences, bipartisan support becomes more attainable.

Successful Federal-State Security Partnerships

Examining case studies from past mega-events

Historical examples of successful federal-state security partnerships offer valuable insights for California federal security planning 2028 Olympics. These case studies demonstrate that effective collaboration is possible despite the complexity of major events:

2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics represented a watershed moment in American event security, occurring just months after the September 11 attacks. The Utah Olympic Public Safety Command (UOPSC) established an integrated command structure that brought together 20 federal agencies, state authorities, and local police departments under a unified operational framework. Despite the heightened threat environment, the Games proceeded without major security incidents.

Key success factors included:

• Early establishment of a joint coordination center 18 months before the Games
• Clear delineation of roles with the FBI handling intelligence and counterterrorism while local law enforcement managed public safety and venue security
• Regular joint training exercises that identified communication gaps before the operational period

2016 National Political Conventions in Cleveland and Philadelphia demonstrated effective bipartisan security planning despite the inherently political nature of the events. Both conventions received NSSE designation, with $50 million in federal security funding each. Despite occurring during a contentious election cycle, security operations were seamless at both events.

The success hinged on:

• Separation of security planning from political operations
• Establishment of multi-agency coordination centers with co-located representatives from all jurisdictions
• Deployment of integrated technology platforms that enabled real-time information sharing

Super Bowl 56 in Los Angeles (2022) provides the most recent and geographically relevant example of successful federal-state security partnerships. The event utilized a security footprint that extended throughout the Los Angeles metropolitan area, similar to what will be required for the 2028 Olympics, albeit on a smaller scale.

The operation featured:

• A Unified Command Group with representatives from 80 agencies
• Joint operations centers that coordinated intelligence and response activities
• Deployment of advanced technologies including counter-drone systems and AI-enhanced surveillance

These case studies demonstrate that despite the complexity of multi-jurisdictional security operations, effective collaboration is achievable with proper planning, clear command structures, and commitment from all stakeholders.

Lessons learned for effective collaboration

Analysis of past mega-events reveals several consistent lessons that can inform federal-state security partnerships for the 2028 Olympics:

Early engagement emerges as perhaps the most critical factor in successful security partnerships. The planning cycle for Olympic security typically begins at least four years before the Games, allowing time to develop relationships, conduct risk assessments, and test operational plans. For the 2028 Olympics, this means substantive security planning should already be underway.

Unified command structures with clear decision-making authorities prevent confusion during operations. The most successful security operations establish a single command center where representatives from all agencies work side-by-side, sharing information in real time and making coordinated decisions. This approach requires agencies to partially surrender autonomy for the greater good of the mission.

Regular joint exercises that simulate various crisis scenarios help identify gaps in plans and build familiarity among personnel from different agencies. The 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics included over 20 full-scale exercises before the Games, each addressing different threat scenarios and refining response protocols.

Technology integration requires early attention to ensure systems compatibility across jurisdictions. Successful security operations establish common platforms for information sharing, typically requiring significant investment in interface development and staff training well before the event.

Community engagement in security planning improves both effectiveness and public acceptance. Local businesses, community organizations, and residents can provide valuable insights about neighborhood dynamics while serving as additional “eyes and ears” during the event if properly engaged.

These lessons point to a clear conclusion: the foundation for successful federal-state security partnerships for the 2028 Olympics must be built on professional relationships and operational systems that can withstand potential political turbulence in the intervening years.

Building a Collaborative Security Framework

A forward-looking security strategy for the 2028 Olympics requires not just learning from the past but innovating for the future. The six-year runway to the Games provides ample opportunity to establish new models of federal-state security partnerships that can serve as templates for future collaboration.

Creating depoliticized coordination mechanisms should be an immediate priority. This could include establishing an Olympic Security Planning Board with equal representation from federal, state, and local agencies, intentionally structured to balance political affiliations while emphasizing technical expertise. The board would develop strategic security plans while leaving operational decisions to professional security personnel.

Engaging technology innovators in security planning brings fresh perspectives to persistent challenges. California’s technology sector represents a unique resource for the 2028 Olympics, offering expertise in areas from artificial intelligence to cybersecurity. Creating a Technology Advisory Council for Olympic security could harness this innovation potential while ensuring new technologies are deployed responsibly and with appropriate privacy safeguards.

Building public support through transparency helps ensure security measures are understood and accepted. While some aspects of security planning must remain confidential, regular public updates on progress, approaches, and expectations can build confidence and cooperation. This is particularly important for measures that may impact daily life for Southern California residents during the Games.

International partnerships add another dimension to security planning. Previous Olympic host cities represent a valuable knowledge resource, and federal agencies can facilitate information sharing with international counterparts. The 2024 Paris and 2026 Milan Winter Olympics will provide fresh insights that can be incorporated into planning for Los Angeles.

Comprehensive training programs that bring together personnel from different jurisdictions build both capability and camaraderie. Beyond technical skills, these programs should emphasize cultural competency for engaging with international visitors and linguistic capabilities to serve the diverse Olympic community.

By implementing these forward-looking approaches, California and federal authorities can develop a security framework for the 2028 Olympics that not only protects the event but establishes new standards for bipartisan collaboration in security planning for future national events.